Partisanship, Partisan Context, and Local Climate Policy

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between partisanship and cities’ approaches to climate policy. Do partisan patterns at the local level match those we observe at the national level? Whose partisanship matters: that of elected officials, citizens, or other actors? Previous research indicates that constraints created by the federal system dampen the effects of partisanship on many local policies. Given the absence of strong federal policy direction in the environmental policy arena, this paper’s hypothesis is that clear partisan differences should emerge at the local level. Employing data from a recent survey of local government officials, the analysis provides evidence that the specific constituencies targeted by a given policy affect whose partisanship matters. These effects remain robust after accounting for the broader partisan environment. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the determinants of local climate policy and for our growing knowledge of the influence of partisanship in local politics.

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Introduction

Climate scientists have reached virtual consensus that human activity has fundamentally changed the earth’s climate and that human action will be required to slow, reverse, and/or adapt to those changes (e.g., National Research Council 2011); yet the politics of climate change in the U.S. remain far from consensual. Sharp partisan cleavages persist in the national debate over climate policy (Shipan and Lowery 2001), with Democrats advocating proactive approaches to reduce greenhouse gases and mandate the use of renewable energy, and Republicans pushing for more limited approaches or even denying the scientific evidence (Rothenstein et al. 2011). Recently, we have seen Democrats and Republicans in Congress squaring off over such issues as regulating greenhouse gas emissions, strengthening automotive emissions standards, and limiting the EPA’s authority (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2011).

This paper considers the contours of climate politics and policy at the local level. In the absence of strong and effective federal policy leadership, cities and other local governments find themselves on the front lines of public climate policy efforts.¹ Lutsey and Sperling (2008) find dozens of states and hundreds of cities participating in voluntary efforts aimed at mitigating climate change. They estimate that full implementation of these combined efforts “could stabilize U.S. [greenhouse gas] emissions at 2010 levels by the year 2020” (p. 673). Diverse organizations such as California’s Institute for Local Government, the U.S. Department of

¹ A substantial body of scholarship considers states’ roles in climate policy (e.g., Rabe 2004). For the purposes of the current paper, we consider city policies as distinct from those of their state governments.
Transportation, and the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) sponsor programs at the state, national, and international levels, respectively, to provide local governments with resources they need to institute effective local climate change programs.

Despite their important role in U.S. climate policy, we know little about the ways that cities decide whether and how to deal with climate change and what political factors shape their policies. Most local climate policies are strictly voluntary – local governments are free to adopt them or not – and many can be characterized as public goods: they impose direct, concentrated costs on the producing jurisdiction and provide diffuse benefits to people in other jurisdictions. These two features mean that local decision-makers must overcome significant barriers when they choose to adopt climate policies. Recent research has focused on a variety of determinants, including population characteristics, institutional features, and governance arrangements (see Portney and Berry (2010) for an excellent summary of recent research that investigates the determinants of the related but arguably broader concept of sustainability).

This paper examines the relationship between partisanship and cities’ approaches to climate policy. Do partisan patterns at the local level match those we observe at the national level? In other words, do Democratic cities pursue proactive climate policies, while Republican cities pursue indirect and/or weaker policies or none at all?

Understanding how partisanship shapes cities’ approaches to climate policy is important for several reasons. First, it informs our general understanding of the
determinants of local policy, adding to the growing body of literature that seeks to understand what national political processes also apply at the local level and what processes are unique to local politics. Second, it provides insight into the distinctive politics of climate policy, which will only become more salient as the effects of climate change become more severe. Third, it provides guidance for policy entrepreneurs and advocates to more effectively direct their energy and resources towards favorable opportunities for policy leadership, experimentation and change.

This paper investigates the relationship between partisanship and local climate policy by combining recently collected survey data about local government participation in a variety of climate change programs with information on partisanship at various geographic scales. The current paper’s focus is on climate change policies intended to reduce carbon emissions/greenhouse gases and increase reliance on renewable energy; future research will consider other aspects of climate change policy as well.2

**Partisanship and Local Policy Outcomes**

Political science research has clearly demonstrated that partisanship is a key determinant of political behavior and policy outcomes at the national level. Amongst the mass public, partisanship hugely dominates voting decisions (Green, Palmquist, 2

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2 One area of growing local involvement is in efforts towards *adapting* to the consequences of climate change. This includes, for example, emergency preparedness planning, increasing drainage/sewage capacity, strengthening coastal/waterfront infrastructure, changing landscaping practices, public education efforts, etc. These policies are in contrast to most current efforts, including those that are the focus of the current paper, which focus on *mitigating* the causes of climate change rather than adapting to their consequences.
and Schickler 2002), policy positions (Carmines and Stimson 1989), core values (Goren 2004) and political evaluations (Popkin 1991). Amongst political elites, party organizations are key sources of information and resources (Aldrich 1995), and party effects are strong and consistent determinants of roll call voting (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Many of the congressional roll call votes on major legislation in recent years have split along party lines (cites – stimulus, health care, debt ceiling).

Given the dominance of partisanship in the national-level political process, it is natural to ask whether the same holds true at the local level. Does partisanship play a similar role in local-level political processes? Does it play a key role in structuring the political behavior of both mass citizens and political elites? After all, many of the same people vote in national and local elections and the same party labels and organizations provide resources and cues to candidates and voters.

Despite these similarities, there are reasons to be pessimistic. Many local elections are officially non-partisan (i.e., party labels are not listed on the ballots), though even in those elections, partisan cues are often available (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Voters in local elections may consider numerous other factors besides partisanship, such as incumbency or non-policy attributes (Shaffner et al. 2001). Local government decision-makers may be more constrained than national decision-makers in their ability to institute partisan policies due to both market (Tiebout 1956, Ferreira and Gyourko 2009) and political factors (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). And finally, policies pursued by local governments may not align
with the same partisan cleavages as most national issues, and different cleavages may exist and/or be more important.

Partisanship and Environmental Policy Preferences

Unlike many policies pursued by local governments, there do appear to be clear partisan differences in preferences towards local environmental policies. These show up among both regular citizens and political elites, and on both general and specific issues. [Summarize literature on partisanship and environmental policy preferences.]

Hypotheses

These results clearly indicate that strong partisan differences in environmental/climate policy preferences exist among both citizens and elites. We might therefore expect to see clear partisan differences in the climate policies pursued at the local level, with Democratic cities more likely to adopt proactive climate policies and Republican cities less likely to adopt such policies. However, all is not so simple. As discussed above, city actors may be constrained in their ability to pursue policies that coincide with their partisan policy preferences. In addition, citizen and elite partisanship may differ. A citizenry dominated by one party may elect a city council with a different partisan majority, or they may elect a mayor with
a different partisan affiliation. When this happens, it is not clear whose partisanship should matter.

This analysis focuses on who is the primary target of a particular climate policy. Some climate policies provide direct benefits to residents – for example, recycling programs, refunds or rebates for purchases of certain environmentally-friendly products, and programs that publically recognize individual efforts. Others are more focused on the internal operations of government. These include planning initiatives, green municipal purchasing programs, environmentally friendly workplace practices, etc. These programs clearly provide benefits to residents and others who care about the environment; however, their primary targets, in terms of influencing behavior, are the governments (and government employees) themselves. In the former case, where programs directly target residents, we expect the partisanship and policy preferences of residents/citizens to be the more important determinants of a city’s policy choices. In the latter case, where programs target government practices, we expect government officials’ partisanship and policy preferences to be the more important determinants. These expectations are captured in the following hypotheses.

H$_1$: For policies that provide direct benefits/programs/services to residents and local businesses, citizen partisanship will affect whether a city adopts the policy. Cities with a higher percentage of Democratic residents will be more likely to adopt, and cities with a lower percentage Democratic residents will be less likely to adopt, such policies.

H$_2$: For policies that provide indirect benefits/programs/services to residents, elected officials’ partisanship will affect whether a city adopts the policy. Cities with

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3 In the Michigan data that we analyze below, this partisan mismatch occurs in 38% of the 1000 cities and townships in our sample.
Democratic elected officials will be more likely to pursue, and cities with Republican elected officials will be less likely to pursue, such policies.

H0: There will be no differences in the policies pursued by cities with Democratic and Republican elected officials and with Democratic and Republican citizens.

Data

Testing these hypotheses requires data about the climate policies being pursued by cities and other local governments, as well as the partisanship of both citizens and elected officials. This paper utilizes a unique dataset that contains these elements.

The core of the dataset is a recent survey of Michigan local government officials: The Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS). MPPS is a bi-annual survey of local government officials from each of the 1859 general-purpose local governments in Michigan, including cities, villages, townships, and counties. Email invitations are sent to the top appointed official and the top elected official in each jurisdiction; both groups of officials are invited to complete the approximately 30 minute survey online or to request a hard copy. The fall 2010 wave of MPPS contained a number of questions about local climate change mitigation policies, as well as questions about the respondent’s partisan identification and personal beliefs about a number of climate-related issues. Of the 1859 local governments included in the sampling

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4 The Michigan Public Policy Survey is conducted by the University of Michigan’s Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, and a number of other sponsors. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations.

5 Cities, villages and townships are all considered incorporated places in Michigan.
frame, 1459 completed surveys were received from 1189 unique jurisdictions. Since one of the key hypotheses concerns the effect of elected officials’ partisanship, the sample is limited to the 1,000 complete responses from city or township elected officials.\(^6\)

Fall 2010 MPPS asked the following battery of questions about local climate change policies in the respondent's jurisdiction:

**Q25. Some local governments are adopting policies and practices to meet their jurisdictions’ energy demands while reducing the costs and environmental impacts of energy use. In your opinion, in the next 12 months, how likely or unlikely is it that your jurisdiction will adopt the following types of policies and practices?**

- *Improving energy efficiency in your government facilities (such as lighting, insulation, or HVAC upgrades, anti-idling policies for municipal fleets, etc.)*
- *Changing your jurisdiction’s work practices (such as water conservation, thermostat regulation, etc.)*
- *Programs targeted at residents (such as recycling programs, promoting home weatherization, etc.)*
- *Programs targeted at local businesses (such as rebates to businesses that cut consumption, commercial recycling, formal recognition of green practices, etc.)*
- *Developing or purchasing alternative energy sources (such as employing solar panels or wind turbines)*

Response options were: *Already Adopted; Very Likely to Adopt; Somewhat Likely; Neither Likely Nor Unlikely; Somewhat Unlikely; Very Unlikely to Adopt; and Don’t Know.* Table 1 reports the raw responses to this question.

\(^6\) The analysis is also limited to cities and townships, excluding responses from village and county officials. In Michigan, village boundaries overlap township boundaries, and so vote returns, the basis of our key citizen partisanship variable, are not reported at the village level. Counties are excluded since they have less fiscal and autonomy from the state than do other local governments and their respondents who completed our survey were all appointed officials.
Table 1 Here

It is interested to first note several patterns in the raw data. First, some of these programs are much more popular than others. Over twenty percent of respondents report that their cities or townships have already adopted the first three policies (energy efficiency in public facilities, municipal workplace practices, and programs targeting residents), and a quarter report being very or somewhat likely to adopt them in the near future. By contrast, only a very few respondents have programs targeting businesses and alternative energy purchasing programs in their jurisdictions. Second, there is a wide range of responses regarding the likelihood of adopting each of the policies in the future. This suggests that there may be quite a lot of heterogeneity across jurisdictions in terms of their preferences for various climate policies. Our empirical analyses test whether some of this variance can be attributed to the jurisdiction’s partisan context.

To test hypotheses 1 and 2, policies are clustered according to their primary direct beneficiaries. The first, second and fifth options all represent policies that are aimed at internal governmental/organizational behaviors; these are clustered into one group of “internal” policies. The third and fourth options represent policies that provide benefits or services directly to local residents and businesses; these are clustered into a second group of “external” policies. The hypotheses are that residents’ partisanship will affect the probability of a city adopting external policies and that elected officials’ partisanship will affect the probability of a city adopting internal policies.
In addition to these two sets of policies, the dataset is supplemented with information about each city’s participation in two national programs: The U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement and the Sierra Club’s Cool Cities Program. Both programs ask signatories to take concrete steps to reduce carbon emissions and implement clean energy solutions; both have over one thousand participating U.S. cities and other local governments. In Michigan, 31 local governments are currently participants in the US Mayors program and 28 are participants in the Cool Cities program. These programs share many similarities with the internal policies included in the MPPS survey, i.e., they involve activities such as implementing green planning processes and adopting smart energy solutions at the municipal level. As such, the hypothesis is that elected officials’ partisanship will affect the probability of a city participating in these programs.

Results

Table 2 reports the results of a preliminary analysis of the relationship between partisanship and local climate policies. Each column reports the results of a separate regression-type estimation. The dependent variable in each case is a binary variable coded 1 if the city or township has at least one of the policies (for External and Internal policies) or is a participant in the program (for US Mayors and Cool Cities) and coded 0 otherwise. Given the binary dependent variables, logistic regression is employed.
The key independent variables in each logit analysis are the percent of voters from that jurisdiction that voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 Presidential election (Dem %)\(^7\) and the respondent’s party identification (PID).\(^8\) Dem % is our measure of citizens’ partisanship while PID is our measure of elected officials’ partisanship. The remaining independent variables are intended as controls; they include a dummy variable indicating whether the local government is a City; the natural log of Median Household Income (lnIncome); Percent of Adults with a Bachelor’s Degree (Bachelor %); Percent of the Population Over 65 Years (Over 65 %); and the natural log of Total Population (lnPop). Data on jurisdiction type come from the Michigan Secretary of State (2008); Income, education, age and population data are all from the U.S. Census’ 2009 American Communities Survey (5-year estimates).\(^9\)

**Table 2 Here**

The first column of Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is whether or not the jurisdiction has adopted any of the External policies included in the MPPS. As hypothesized, Dem % is positive and

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\(^7\) There were several minor party candidates on the ballot. Source: Michigan Secretary of State Election Results 2008.

\(^8\) Source: MPPS Fall 2010. PID is measured on a standard 7-point scale with 7=strong Democrat.

\(^9\) MPPS Fall 2010 also included questions measuring the respondent’s attitudes on a number of climate-related issues such as whether promoting sustainability is an important element of local leadership, the severity of global warming as a public policy problem, and the responsibilities of local, state, and federal governments in reducing global warming. In supplemental analyses, responses to these questions were included as additional regressors in the logit analyses. None were statistically significant, and given the potential that these attitudes and the respondent’s partisanship are jointly determined, they are excluded from the final model specifications.
significant; jurisdictions with a more Democratic citizenry are more likely to adopt climate policies targeted at residents or local businesses compared to jurisdictions with a more Republican citizenry. The elected official’s party identification \((PID)\) is insignificant, also as hypothesized. In addition, several of the controls are significant, including \(City\), \(lnIncome\) and \(Over\ 65\%\).

The second column of Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is whether or not the jurisdiction has any of the MPPS’s \(Internal\) policies in place. Here we see the opposite pattern in the partisanship variables: the elected official’s party identification is positive and significant (jurisdictions whose elected officials identify as stronger Democrats are more likely to have internal climate policies) and the citizenry’s partisanship is insignificant. Larger jurisdictions and those with a more highly educated citizenry are more likely to adopt internal climate policies as well.

The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report two more logistic regressions, with participation in the \(US\ Mayors\) program and the \(Cool\ Cities\) program as the binary dependent variables, respectively. As with the \(Internal\) policies, \(PID\) is positive and significant, with Democratic elected officials more likely to participate in these programs. Unlike the \(Internal\) policies, however, \(Dem\ %\) is negative and significant: cities with larger percentages of Democratic voters are less likely to participate in these programs. Cities (compared to townships) and larger jurisdictions are more likely to participate.

**Partisan Context**
The preliminary results indicate that partisanship does, indeed, affect the probability that a jurisdiction adopts or participates in a particular climate change policy/program, and that the policy content – specifically the identity of the direct beneficiaries/recipient – determines whose partisanship matters. One potential shortcoming of this preliminary analysis, however, is that it limits consideration to actors internal to a given jurisdiction and does not account for the broader political/partisan environment in which the local government unit is situated. This broader partisan environment could affect local policy choices in several ways. Partisan actors outside a local government’s boundaries may *directly* affect policy choices by providing resources, information, or policy leadership to local government officials. For example, like-minded county government officials may directly assist local governments in adopting programs or joining on-going county efforts. Partisan actors outside a local government’s boundaries may also *indirectly* affect local policy choices. For example, county government officials may initiate climate policies at the county level, effectively satisfying some of the local need/demand for climate policies and allowing local government officials to devote resources to other activities. The regional partisan political environment may also predispose residents in a given jurisdiction to be more or less receptive to climate policies within their city or township.

Table 3 reports selected results from a series of logistic regressions that begin with the analyses reported in Table 2 and add several elements to account for the broader partisan political climate. The table reports the significance level of various measures of partisanship (note that each set of results are from a
multivariate logistic regression that also includes the controls reported in Table 2). The first panel of Table 3 exactly replicates the Table 2 analyses that include just Dem % and PID plus controls. The second panel clusters the standard errors by county to account for any spatial autocorrelation that might be caused by county-level political processes. The third panel adds a direct measure of county partisanship, which is the countywide percent of the 2008 Presidential vote that went to Obama in 2008 (County Dem %). The fourth panel adds a measure that captures whether the jurisdiction is part of a partisan cluster or “hot spot,” specifically the jurisdiction’s estimated Z-score for the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for Dem %.

Table 3 Here

The results in Table 3 indicate that the partisanship effects observed in Table 2 are quite robust. The effect of the electorate’s partisanship remains positive and significant in all of the External policy model specifications. Similarly, the effect of elected official’s party identification remains positive and significant in all of the specifications for Internal policies and participation in the US Mayors and Cool Cities specifications for Internal policies and participation in the US Mayors and Cool Cities

10 Spatial autocorrelation is the lack of independence between unobserved factors related to units as a function of their spatial locations. Of course, we cannot confidently attribute county-level spatial autocorrelation to specific factors such as partisanship, as county-level partisanship is only one potential cause of spatial autocorrelation.

11 Gi* uses GIS to compute the average value for one spatial unit (jurisdiction) and its immediate neighbors on the variable of interest (in this case Dem %), and compares that local average to the global average. If the cluster’s average value is statistically different from the global average, the unit is considered to be part of a “hot spot” (for high values) or a “cold spot” for (low values). See xx. As illustrated in Figure 1A, Dem % shows a high degree of clustering, with both Democratic hot spots (in red) and Republican cold spots (in blue) throughout the state.
programs. In only one case (*Internal* policies with clustered standard errors), the main partisanship effect drops below standard significance levels but is still significant at p<.10. In other words, even after we account for the effect of spatial autocorrelation, county partisanship and partisan clustering, the electorate's partisanship remains a strong and significant determinant of whether a city chooses to adopt external climate policies. The elected official's party identification remains a strong and significant determinant of whether a city chooses to adopt internal climate policies or participate in initiatives such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement and the Sierra Club’s Cool Cities Program.

The Table 3 results also indicate that the broader partisan context has a direct effect on adoption of climate policies, above and beyond a jurisdiction’s internal partisan dynamics. Inclusion in a partisan cluster has a strong, positive and significant effect on the probability that a jurisdiction adopts both External and Internal policies. In other words, cities that are part of a Democratic partisan cluster are significantly more likely to adopt local climate policies (and cities that are part of a Republican partisan cluster are significantly less likely to adopt local climate policies) than one would expect just considering the partisanship of citizens within their jurisdictional boundaries. From the available data, it is not possible to distinguish whether this effect is due to its effect on government officials or citizens or both. But in any case, it quite clearly indicates that the broader partisan environment is an important factor that must be taken into account in our efforts to understand the dynamics of partisanship and local climate policy.
**Implications**

To summarize, analysis of the MPPS data suggests that partisanship affects local climate policy in ways that are consistent with this paper’s characterization of a given policy’s direct targets or beneficiaries: when a policy targets residents or businesses, the partisanship of the jurisdiction’s electorate significantly influences the probability of that jurisdiction adopting such a policy. When a policy seeks to influence the behavior of government employees or decision-makers, it is the partisanship of the jurisdiction’s elected officials that matters. Further, local policy decisions are made within a broader partisan political environment, and the effects of regional partisanship affect local climate policy decisions as well.

These findings have important implications for our understanding of the influence of partisanship on local policy processes and outcomes. Recent studies of the effect of partisanship at the local level tend to focus on fiscal policy outcomes and the effect of the mayor’s partisanship on those outcomes. Given that most fiscal policies: 1) result from a political interaction between the mayor and the city council (who might have different partisan affiliations); 2) are constrained by mandates, contracts, and on-going obligations; and 3) provide direct benefits/services to residents and businesses (rather than target the behavior of government actors), it is not surprising that they find limited (Gerber and Hopkins 2011) or null (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009) results. This paper focuses on policies that differ in all three respects: they often result from unilateral mayoral/executive action; they are less constrained by other levels of government; and they vary in terms of whose behavior they target. By more directly linking characteristics of a policy with
relevant measures of partisanship, this paper provides evidence of the conditional effects of local partisanship.

These findings are also important for how we think about climate policy, specifically voluntary policies that aim to mitigate climate change by reducing carbon emissions and/or energy consumption. The analysis encourages us to consider the complex interplay between local partisanship and the broader partisan environment. Local forces clearly matter, especially on policies that involve targeting the behavior of municipal government employees and participation in the programs of national organizations such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the Sierra Club. These forces include both partisanship as well as features of the local government such as population size and capacity (i.e., whether they are full-service cities as opposed to townships). At the same time, there is evidence that partisan actors outside a jurisdiction may also influence a jurisdiction's climate policy decisions. These outside actors may be especially important in helping local government officials overcome the potentially formidable barriers inherent in voluntary climate mitigation policies such as those included in the current analyses.

Future research will expand the set of climate policies to include those focused on adaptation to the consequences of climate change. In contrast to the mitigation policies analyzed in this paper, adaptation policies lend more naturally to intergovernmental collaborative approaches since the impacts they seek to combat – storms, droughts, flooding, rising or falling water levels, heat events – tend to occur at a regional scale. A preliminary hypothesis is that these features of
adaptation policies will result in a more important role for actors outside a given jurisdiction and will demonstrate greater spatial interdependencies.

Finally, there are implications for how policy advocates target their resources. Many of the policies studied here – especially internal mitigation policies and participation in the national organizations’ programs – appear not to be driven less by local (or regional) citizen demand and more by the personal decisions of local government officials, whose own partisanship and preferences may be at odds with the citizens they represent. These officials, who are in most cases big-city mayors, play leadership roles as policy entrepreneurs, setting the local agenda and creating a “green” culture within the organizations of their city governments. This suggests that advocates may be well served to pursue a top-down strategy, targeting elected officials, rather than a bottom-up public education strategy. Future research will more closely consider the role of local elected officials as climate policy entrepreneurs.
References


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<th></th>
<th>Energy Efficiency in Facilities</th>
<th>Changing Workplace Practices</th>
<th>Programs Targeting Residents</th>
<th>Programs Targeting Businesses</th>
<th>Purchasing Alternative Energy</th>
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<td>20.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
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Table 2: Partisanship and Local Climate Policy, Michigan Cities and Townships
Logistic Regression Coefficients

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<th>Internal</th>
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<td>-.39</td>
<td>-12.71**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.11)</td>
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Source: Michigan Public Policy Survey, Fall 2010
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 3: Partisanship, Context, and Local Climate Policies
Significance of Logistic Regression Coefficients on Partisanship Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>US Mayors</th>
<th>Cool Cities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Dem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 2 (Clustered)</td>
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<td>Model 3 (w/ Co Dem %)</td>
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<td>Model 4 (w/ Gi*)</td>
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<td>Z (Gi*)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Figure 1A: Democratic Share of the Two-Party Vote for President, 2008. Getis-Ord Gi*. Hot Spots (in red) and Cold Spots (in blue).